Dr. Upendra Kumar Assistant Professor Department of Philosophy Janki Devi Memorial College (University Of Delhi) Sir Ganga Ram Hospital Marg, Rajinder Nagar New Delhi-110060

# CONCEPT OF LIMITATION IN KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY: A CRITICAL APPRECIATION

The paper is a preliminary inquiry into the so called lateral entry of the term 'Limitation' in Kant's transcendental philosophy in *Critique of Pure Reason*, abbreviated as CPR. Referring to its lateral entry Beatrice Longuenesse holds that "the word 'limitation' occurs only once, almost as an afterthought, in a passage where Kant describes space and time as quanta continua: "Points and instants are only limits, that is, mere places for the limitation of space and time" (A161/B211). What puzzles us most is the import of Kant's statement that "Space is essentially one; the manifold in it, and therefore the general *concept of spaces*, depends solely on limitations." (B69) How can we place 'points and instants' for the determination of certain properties about the form of space? A discourse in this direction may prove a new insight to understand Kant's transcendental theory of knowledge in which "concept of spaces depends solely on limitations." Does the concept of limitation separate one space into two states of knowledge, namely *phenomena* from *noumenon* in order to prevent sensible intuition enter the pure concepts of thinking about the unknowable?

Referring to the complete absence of the term 'limitation' in Kant's Schemata and explicit warrant in the Table of Categories, Longuenesse draws our attention towards this as a fact: "Surprisingly, the category of limitation seems at first be missing in the Schematism chapter as well as in the *Anticipation of Perception*. Even the word 'limitation' is absent from the Schematism." Without refuting the lateral entry of the term 'Limitation' in the cognitive faculty of Understanding and its manifestations in the Category of Judgment, we find its variables throughout the CPR. The variables such as 'limit', 'limits', 'limited', 'limiting', 'limitable' as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> B. Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 305-06.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> References are from I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, , N. Kemp Smith , trans. (London: Macmillan Press, 1971) , p.69

Billid., Beatrice Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, p. 305.

well as 'limitless', 'unlimited' and "limitlessness in the progression of intuition" (B69) are found more than 45 times in different contexts of the CPR. Right from the two Prefaces (1781/1787) of the CPR to the last *The History of Pure Reason*, Kant seeks to determine the limits and scope of metaphysics in general but at the same time extend the pure concepts of cognitive faculties of Understanding, Judgment and Reason as a whole. Though the aforesaid variables of the term 'limitation' occur almost in every chapter including 'Transcendental Dialectic', but we never find a definition or a separate chapter on 'Limitation' as Kant has on *Concept of Freedom*. Though the term 'limitation' remains undefined but the manifestations of its role in Kant's theory of universal knowledge in the faculty of Understanding cannot be overlooked.

The term 'Limitation' happens to be the translated version of the German word Einschränkung for singular and Einschränkungen for its plural are meant to denote limits of experience in cognitive faculty. It simultaneously signifies qualitative limitlessness of pure concepts with certain alteration or change brought by the concept of judgment to unite with cognitive faculty of reason. As both the ends of the term 'Limitation' (limiting/limitlessness) are to be yoked together through the transitory faculty of Judgment, we are in a fix as to how to understand its conceptual importance in Kant's epistemology. Contrary to the German word, the English version of the term is derived from the Latin word 'limitationem.' Its indirect association with Old French 'limitaction' means an act of putting a boundary in a given space or drawing a boundary against the motion of an action in general and metaphysics particularly in Kant's doctrine of pure reason. We wonder as to why this field of creating a boundary against a motion or a division in space with a sign of a point or points has been overlooked.

The term is generally speculated as "limits of knowledge", "finite degree of knowledge" or self knowledge to enclose "a degree of reality within limits" as if the term was exclusively meant for the phenomenal reality. The ulterior motive behind such assumptions is not known but it is certain that the aforesaid variables ('limit', 'limits'/ 'limiting'/ 'unlimited' etc.) of term 'limitation' have been speculated differently in Kant's philosophical discourses on 'reason', 'understanding', 'sensibility', 'judgment' and Disjunctive. Here a question arises: Does the extension of phenomenal reality ever need limitation from entering into Noumena?

The paper looks forward to determine the significance of the term in relation to Kant's opening statements in the CPR: "That all our knowledge begins with experience," and that "the knowledge *a priori* is either *pure* or *impure*." If all knowledge begins with intermingled state

such as good or bad, true or false, pure or impure and so on, there must be a division as well as extension of pure concepts and exclusion of what is 'impure', false or illusive dogmas. There is a need to put limitation against such motions called 'concealed errors' from being extended to pure concept of understanding and pure reason.

# **Ampliative Principle and Limitation**

It seems plausible to assume that Kant's propositional statement is latently build up on the term 'ampliative principle' (CPR,51) which divides 'the knowledge *a priori*' of pure reason from 'impure' experiences which remain mixed up as 'concealed errors' or remain intermingled with the pure reason. The analogical connection between 'ampliative principle' that divides and 'limitation' that limits represents an act of putting 'object intellects' such as 'points and instants' to draw a boundary in a given space, time or a field of knowledge. The concept of 'Limitation' in this regard remains manifest in Kant's 'ampliative principle' or the 'ampliative principle' which creates division and extension remains latent in limitation of the so called pure concepts of understanding. Its primary function is exclusion of what is false or impure in experience as well as disjunctive relation and a secondary function is to put a limit against such motions of impure knowledge to protect what is pure.

#### Limitation is simply a reality combined with negation

The implications of the term 'limitation' needs reconsideration in its association with its verb forms such as to limit, limited or limiting to mean an act of fixing a mark or boundary or a sign between pure and impure or a circle around the pure. While fixing a boundary, we obviously enter into an act of division and extension of the sub-subdivisions of each division of the circle. The assumption is based on Kant's two premises: that "All bodies are divisible," (A68/B93) and that "in judgment all bodies are divisible." Logically, if the concept of judgment joins understanding and reason, all bodies are also divisible in judgment. In this regard we ought to approve that "Some divisible is a body." (p.79)

If the statement holds truth, the function of 'ampliative principle' that he proposes to create division in a space or between pure and impure cannot be overruled. Hence the cognitive faculty of rational knowledge that divides all bodies tends to be Phenomena and Noumena with certain signs of intellect such as a point or period of time or a dot in space with which an act of limitation with a line in a circle or a doctrine or a method becomes applicable. The concept of

experience without 'limitation' or 'ampliative principle' of division will suggest an intermingled state of things in which the pure and impure would remain perceivable as well as unthinkable. If Kant asserts "Limitation is simply a reality combined with negation," we ought to reconsider the implication of the term in relation to his thesis of intermingled state that "All our knowledge starts with senses, proceeds from thence to understanding, and ends with reason ...and bringing it into the highest unity of thought." (A299/B355)

In Kant's philosophy the meaning of the term 'limitation' is not the central issue, but its representation which governs the act of division and extension of divided categories becomes explicable when he proposes: "thoughts without content are empty, intuition without concepts are blind" (A51/B76). If Descartes holds, "By extension we mean whatever has length, breadth and depth, leaving aside the question whether it is a real body or merely a space," (The Philosophical Writings, Vol. I)<sup>5</sup> his influence on Kant may have given birth to the idea of "ampliative principle" and its lateral manifestation into 'limitation' which becomes explicit in the category of Quality. It is in this context we propose that the term 'limitation' originates in the 'ampliative principle' which speaks of division and extension (CPR, 51) and becomes explicit with variables. Kant's major concern was how to make the term 'limitation' functional in understanding and intuitive concepts that that remain mixed up in experience. Our proposition on the term 'limitation' lies in an assumption that without division and exclusion of the erroneous, false or concealed errors of experience, the notion of "Reality-Nothing-Limitation" in the category of Quality and judgment would remain unthinkable.

#### **Schematized from the Unschematized experiences**

Our proposition becomes plausible when we find Kant discussing schematization of the categories and system of all principles. He talks about *schematized* categories and differentiates the *schematized* from the *unschematized* categories. He proposes that the schematized categories have played pivotal role in producing knowledge. But when it comes to 'unschematised categories he clearly declares, "Unschematized categories are meaningless." As human mind is in dilemma with *unschematized* experiences, his will to reason is burdened with superstitions, dogmas and illusions; and Kant holds that "no corresponding object *or objects* (italics added) can ever be given to such experiences." (CPR,45) It is in the Preface to First Edition (1781) he uses

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Kant, Immanuel., 1973, Critique of Pure Reason, p.116.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> As quoted in Nicholas Bunnin, Jiyuan Yu, *Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy*, (John Wiley & Sons, 2008) p.243

the term 'concealed errors', and looks forward to their limitation of their motion as well as their exclusion from pure reason as these analytic falsehoods have been conceived in the fields of metaphysics as well as dogmas of religion.

Therefore, the schematisation of category, where Kant discusses cognitive faculty in terms of its nature, becomes lateral but functional. While dividing, extending and explicating the *schematized* from the *unschematized* categories, Kant conceives three developing sources of the term limitation: The first is Schemata of the following table in which the category of limitation is missing including the word 'limitation' (p.121):

SCHEMATA: NO REFERENCE TO LIMITATION						
1.Axioms of Intuition	2.Anticipations	3.Aalogues	of	4.Postulates	of	
	of Perception	Experience		Empirical thoughts		

If Kant says, "The principles of these categories are distinguishable from those of the two others" (121) namely, 'Cognitive' and 'A Priori Principles', (See the table below) it does not mean that the tern 'limitation' is an afterthought as its manifestation continued latently in the 'ampliative principle' that divides and extends the schematized from unschematize. It is certain that Kant proceeds with the latencies of the term 'limitation' as a missing principle in schemata, but moves onward to discuss it as the kind of a priori knowledge of things as faith that exist in space and time. (A161/B211)

Referring to Understanding, Judgment and Reason as the higher faculties of cognition, Kant anticipates that the concepts of Understanding and Reason "do not limit each other in legislation, though they perpetually do so in the world of sense." It appears that the idea of not limiting each other establishes the necessary homogenous connection between pure concepts of understanding and reason which arise from a number of similar instances in relation to anticipated conjugation which is pure or always right. But the traditional rationalists hold that the term 'limitation' signified a finite degree of reality that remained unlimited, and its relation with 'negation' was the absence of reality. We shall see as to how the 'negation' opposes reality in Kant's category of Quality but in judgment it becomes negative. It is in Reflexion the true identity of Limitation becomes Nothing, which is "=0." The category of 'limitation' in the

-

 $<sup>^6</sup>$   $\,$  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment , J.H.Barnard trans, (Mineola, New York: Dover Publication Inc., 1914) p. 8

cognitive faculties does not limit the concepts but anticipates unity between Understanding and Reason through some altered state called "intelligible object" (CPR 272) of Noumena that curbs the pretentions of sensibility (CPR 272). Kant's hypothesis in joining the concepts of pure sciences Understanding with Reason never ceases to be one of the most exquisitely refined assumptions in philosophy of true knowledge in general and transcendental knowledge in particular.

The following table from Critique of Judgment (CJ, p.26) would help us understand the universal unification of Understanding and Reason against the presences of metaphysics as "time worn dogmatism" (CPR 8) which needs limitation:

ALL THE FACULTIES OF MIND						
Cognitive faculties	Feeling of pleasure and pain	Faculties of Desire				
COGNITIVE FACULTY						
Understanding (verstand)*	Judgment (urtheil)	Reason (vernunft)				
	A PRIORI PRINCIPLES					
Conformity to law	Purposiveness	Final Purpose				
APPLICATION TO						
Nature	Art Freedom*					

A detailed discourse on Kant's above table of Cognitive Faculty comprising Understanding and Reason joined by Judgment would become a large undertaking as the term "Limitation' finds explicit warrant as *a priori* in the tripartite division of the Category of *Quality* into Reality-Negation-Limitation. However, the above category allows us to refer to Kant who says that Understanding and Reason exercise two distinct cognitive faculties without prejudice to each other, while the Critique of Judgment happens to be "a means of combining the two parts of

<sup>\*</sup> Note: The tripartite division of the other than Quality are as follows: *Quantity*: Unity-Plurality-Totality; *Relation*: The inherent and subsistence-Casualty and dependence-Community; *Modality*: Possibility/Impossibility – Being/Non-Being–Necessity/Contingency. We shall limit the discourse to occurrences of the term 'limitation'.

<sup>\*</sup> Note: "Freedom is the faculty of being determined through reason alone, and not mediately but immediately, thus not through but form of law. Thus moral." (*Reflexion* 5436, 18:181) But "moral laws do not originate in Reason "(Reflexion 5445, 18:184)

philosophy into a whole."<sup>7</sup> The table as well as statement serves as a ground for establishing unity between the two according to the laws of 'freedom' legislated by Reason: "The determinant Judgment only subsumes under universal transcendental laws given by the (pure) Understanding."(CJ 12)

II

As per tripartite division of the Category of Quality, Kant explicitly uses the term 'Limitation' pertaining to analytic conception of Understanding, but remains silent on its definition, and detailed explication or discourse. Hence, the togetherness of the concept of Limitation in the Quality may be regrouped in pairs such as Reality-Limitation and Limitation-Negation. It is a necessity as the term remains unexplained in the science of Nature and anticipated productions of the concepts of science to the conformity to laws of Nature which curbs the faculty of subjective experience or desires. However, the term 'limitation' remains manifest in cognitive faculty of Judgment as 'infinite' under the Relation in general and the Table of Judgments in particular. The term under the heading *Relations* in the Table of Judgment needs reconsideration for the exclusion of what is impure judged as 'negative' and inclusion of the explicated pure reason. Since human cognition is not devoid of Reason, we are bound to think of 'intuition' as a pre-faculty of sensibility as well as a post-faculty of intellect. The inclusion of the 'affirmative' and exclusion of the 'negative' judgment in relation to "Yes/No" responses in disjunctive logic become inevitable.

## Intelligible objects or object intellect: an altered form of limitation

The verbal aspects of the term 'limitation' remain manifest not only in a division between pure and impure but also in the exclusion of the impure cum false notions or small motions of so called 'concealed errors', it does not mean that the extension of the pure is neglected. The act of division and exclusion must begin with certain sign such as a dot or its extension in a line the extension may take place in the sign of an inexplicable zero which tends to become a sign of 'nothing' in the reflexions. Analogically, the explicit and implicit entries of the term 'limitation' needs reconsideration in the light of the altered state of limitation called "intelligible object" (p 272) which happens to be understood by intelligent man upon 'intelligible ground' in a given space and time. Kant says, "if by merely intelligible objects we mean those things which are thought through pure categories, without any schema of sensibility, such objects are

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Ibid., Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 9

impossible."(B242) Kant's proposition on 'intelligible object' assumes a new dimension to bring unity between pure concepts of science and Kant's transcendental knowledge of pure Reason in order to make room for faith not in intuited dogmas but Reason. The term's non-occurrence in the cognitive faculty of Reason may be represented with the term conclusion that pervades in 'freedom' to think or know freely in collaboration with the ethics of goodness which remains infinite. Since the term 'infinite' helps judgment unite the pure concepts of Understanding and Reason, we propose that the "intelligible object" be reconsidered as the 'non-ampliative principle' of Noumena to prevent the sensible experience. If Kant uses the term 'veranderung', which is translated to represent the term 'alteration' which we prefer to use the altered state of the term 'limitation' as "intelligible object" of Noumena which simultaneously prevents or negates the dogmas or concealed errors or superstitions which never cease to remain as vanishing small motions of the 'unschematized' experiences. As such aspects of 'concealed errors' do not lack motions to enter into transcendental knowledge, the altered state of 'limitation' or "intelligible object" take compound motions against to shun subjective perceptions and cause them vanish.

III

# **Small motions of subjective experience**

Having dwelt upon the manifest, explicit and altered forms of the term 'limitation', we would like to proceed with Kant's assumption that all of us pass through the subjective sensations, which are opposed to each one's experiences. We cannot consider every momentary experience of sensation as knowledge but treat such experiences as small motions having the semblance of concepts. Intermingled state of all such motions and experiences seem entirely lose and separate. One motion follows the other, but we can never observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined or intermingled but never connected as the pure concepts do. Hence, we fail to categorise such motions unless "they are thought through the understanding." (B655) If Kant holds that senses can think nothing but perceive the intermingled state of things and objects, and that sensibility can neither create objects nor conceptualise anything from intermingling processes of things, we take the opportunity of tracing the subtle manifestations and validity of the term 'ampliative principles' (CPR,51) as a synonym of the term 'limitation' which tends to be an explicit afterthought for the explication of reality but prevention of falseness from entering the finite reality in the table of judgment with negative responses.

Though the term 'ampliative principle' is not listed either in Schemata or the Category but its nature, function as well as relation with the term 'limitation' cannot be denied.

Primarily, Kant uses the term 'limitation' as a method of enquiry to create a division between sensations and pure knowledge of sensibility; phenomena and Noumena; a priori and posteriori with an intent "to limit knowledge in order to make room for faith" (Preface CPR) in pure reason. But the term 'limitation' has its wider applicability as a doctrine because Kant asserts: "Philosophical knowledge is the knowledge gained by reason from concepts." (CPR 577) Since human cognition is not devoid of reason, we are bound to think of 'intuition' not only as a pre faculty of sensibility but also a post faculty of intellect. The act of limitation or an act of creating a boundary extends its manifest implications to create a division between sensibility and intellect. The analogues are from the cognitive faculty of judgement which could be either affirmative or negative in general but infinitive in particular. The analogues of the term 'limitation' such as 'limit', 'limited', 'limiting', 'limitable' on the one hand and 'limitless' or 'unlimited' or "limitlessness in the progression of intuition" (B69) on the other hand never cease to be affected by the logic of Disjunctive relations for the exclusion of errors by defying dogmas at the cost of pure concepts. Hence, its inclusion becomes inevitable in Kant's epistemology. If the extension of the pure is harmonious, we look forward to conceive the conceptual framework of the term 'limitation' to precede with 'limitable' for the exclusion of the false notes as well as limiting these errors; and inclusion and extension of what is pure in terms of disjunctive relation of the phenomena under the table of Judgement.

Our point of view is to highlight the 'ampliative principle' which is essential for every division between *phenomena* and *noumena*, *a priori* and *posteriori* and such pair-wise notions in disjunctive relation for the exclusion of false and inclusion of what is truth or pure in all premises. For instance the premise, "Earth exists either through *an inner necessity* or through *an external cause* or through *a blind chance*" forwarded by R.P. Singh (2004, p.277)<sup>8</sup> must exclude the geocentric false notes of sense perception at the cost of the inclusion of heliocentric concepts of understanding, and their extension with the concepts of natural phenomenon or physical sciences. Analogically, the necessity of Noumena must put a limit to perceptive knowledge of all

8

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> R.P.Singh, "Transcendental Philosophy as Theory of Limit" in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XXXI No. 1 to 4 January-April-July-October, 2004, p. 277.

negations or negative motions because understanding cannot intuit and reason must work for the unity with the pure concepts of understanding.

#### IV

#### Two variables of Negation are Negative and Nothing:

Undoubtedly, Kant's major concern in Anticipations of Perception was to create a division between reality and its real opposition in 'negation' which becomes explicit in The Table of Categories. The table of categories comprises four pure categories namely Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality, but when it comes to be discoursed as actual schemata, Kant clearly remarks: "The pure image of all magnitudes" (CPR,274) of Quantity follows from three concepts of Quality, namely: a) Reality, b) Negation, and c) Limitation. If Kant asserts that "Reality is something; negation is nothing, namely a concept of absence of an object such as shadow, cold,"(CPR p. 295)<sup>9</sup> it requires logical reconsideration of his statement: "Limitation is simply a reality (of something) combined with negation."(CPR,116) The statement helps us dwell upon the idea of opposition on purity as contained in reality (something) and 'negation' which remains manifest in the logical necessity of the principles of judgement which is either truly affirmative or truly negative represented as 'YES' or 'NO' respectively. But the concept of 'negation' in understanding stands in opposition to the concept of a singular reality of quantity. If it is so, we get two variables of the term 'negation' as 'negative' in judgment and 'nothing' in reflexions. If it is so we ought to understand their interrelation with the term 'limitation' as Kant did say: "For all negations are merely limitations of a greater, and ultimately of the highest, reality..." (B 606) The statement could be understood in relation to Newton's pure concept of motion, which refers to the unmoved mover upon which a force or a compounded force is applied.

The logical necessity of analyzing 'negation' and its opposing against reality of a concept is beyond the limits of this paper; but for the present, it will suffice to quote Daniel Warren: "There is an alternate interpretation. Perhaps Kant is only identifying *vanishing small quantities* with cases of 'mere limitation,' rather than limitation in an unqualified sense." <sup>10</sup> The statement appropriates the opposition between reality and negation; it happens to be quantitative opposition

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 295.

As quoted in Daniel Warren, Reality and impenetrability in Kant's Philosophy of Nature (New York: Rutledge, 2001), p.21

as 'negation' negates reality or something affirmative in judgment. An answer to the question -"Does water freeze at zero degrees centigrade?" would be either affirmative or negative in judgment, but prior to its reality as pure concept, it was opposed. Analogically it corresponds to geocentric opposition against heliocentric universe in which the geocentric vision yielded before heliocentric vision of universe. It is expressed in 'yes' or 'no' or Hegelian 'thesis' or 'antithesis.' Our 'yes' for a scientific truth or pure concept may possibly have some weight, when placed in opposition to the 'negation' by those who believe that it is the Most Highest who makes water freeze and increases coldness. Here a question arises as to where the coldness of frozen water comes from. Is the frozen water a limited quality of pure concept or extendable to unlimited quality of truth from point of view of metaphysics? The misgivings, being impure or falsified notions, are negations in principles but 'negative' in logic. Hence such concealed errors of 'negation' must be judged logically and flushed out mutually or forcefully. Opposition continues till compound forces come to unite with the pure concepts. The misgivings would continue in myths, dogmas, superstitions and metaphysics. The pride of the pure concepts cannot be subdued by negative judgments as these become limitless when infinite judgment unites these positive concepts with reason through some alteration in motion or force as each action has a reaction. An inquiry into this altered state of 'limitation' has vast range, but it has not been speculated convincingly. The altered state of limitation may be considered as earnest quest of truth that expands our cognitive faculty in relation to judgment and reason.

If the pure concept is truly affirmative, the idea of the altered state of water into ice at zero degrees becomes inevitable. We quote Warren "There is a suggestion at *Reflexionen* 5821 that Kant wants to apply the notion of limitation to any finite degree of reality, when he says, 'Limitation has degrees to 0..." If the temperature decreases below '0' degree, extra volumes of water freeze but temperature does not increase above zero. The differences of water above zero or below zero degree temperature give us the notion of alteration. If this is the case then limitation can analogically be considered as an altered state of 'Nothing' which limits the dogmas enter into its nothingness to protect the pure concepts of reality. Our contention is to promote the idea that the perception of the doctrine of zero is alteration that does not oppose true reality rather promotes or creates unity in multiplicity in the category of nothing which is partly identical with Zero degrees Celsius which offers possibility of thinking the existence of the sign

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Ibid., D. Warren,

of temperature in synthetic judgment a priori which has never been established for metaphysics and the possibility of its sign has not yet been warranted. (B21-22)

# **Nothing: A concept of Reflexionen**

In the third chapter of the Analytic section of Kant's CPR, an Appendix entitled 'The Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection' has four kinds of nothing which happens to be the doctrine of 'negation' in which each has the function of limitation in its altered state. It is because of Kant's proposition that 'Nothing' tends to be "a concept of absence of an object" such as '0' for frozen water signifying two motions 'freezing and coldness' simultaneously. Similarly, when a straight line is drawn across two points of '0', it represents limitation as well as protection of several phenomena below the line and limitation of Noumena above the line which happens within the circle signifying 'nothing.' The concept of reflexion becomes the discursive response through which the compound motion is signified while coldness is intuited or thought due to pure concept that water freezes at zero-degrees centigrade. Since compound motion exclude each other, the colour of the ice or substance may also be assumed subsequently. The compound motion is possible in Kant's idea of 'nothing' and limitation. The principal problem before Kant was how to expel 'conceived errors' from metaphysics.

Our point of view would become clear by quoting Longuenesse (1989): "Kant defines 'nothing' according to four headings of his table of categories. According to quantity he says, 'nothing' is the object of a concept to which no assignable intuition whatsoever corresponds: the empty extension of a concept. According to Quality, it is the absence of an object, such as shadow, or cold". According to relation, 'nothing' is the mere form of intuition, without substance," namely pure space and time. According to Modality, 'nothing' is the object of a concept which contradicts itself" (A290-91/B247-48). Contrary to Longuenesse' speculations, Daniel Warren writes that Kant discusses limitation and negation in his *Reflexionen* on metaphysics from the 1780's where Kant "distinguishes two sorts of negation and identifies one of them with limitation. He writes (R5816, Akademie Edition 18, 361-2): "Negation is either according to quantity or quality. In the first case, it is always to be regarded as vanishing quantum and nothing but mere limitation... In the second case, it is *neatio oppositionis*, as when I

Beatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 306

say a spirit is not compound, thus it is simple." And at R 5815: Realitas, negatio, limitation; every *negatio* is either mere *limitatio*, i.e. *oppositum* of quantity, or *negatio repugnantiae* and opposition of quality." Since the principle of 'negation' has been placed between Reality and Limitation, it is appropriate to look forward to its grouping with the notion of limitation. It is extremely difficult to delete the term 'limitation' from the category in general and four principles of 'nothing' in particular. However, what interests us most is the notion of opposition between reality and negation; and negation as the 'vanishing quantum'.

In order to elucidate the validity of 'negation' as 'vanishing quantum' in relation to the Table of Judgement, we may consider the following premises:

- 1) In Affirmative Judgment we consider the premise 'All men are mortal' and concept derived from this judgment is 'reality'.
  - 2) In a negative judgment the premise is like 'No crows are white', the concept is 'negation'.
  - 3) In infinitive judgment the premise "Hydrogen gas is not green" represents two aspects namely a possible extension from 'not' (i) that Hydrogen gas has a colour other than green or (ii) a complete negation on sense perception of colour or has no colour at all. This premise is based on casual assertion of compounding motion or forces for final purpose.

Logic does not suffice for the term 'negation' where it is understood as the singular judgment which is in opposition to the singular judgment of the real. The affirmative is formed with the agreement of everyone, while the 'negation' is an attempt to develop a partial logic of 'causality'. The third statement is based on causality and hence cannot be analytic. The term 'Hydrogen' in the third premise itself represents a pure concept as reality. The first (i) section of the statement represents a definite cognition of a component called 'hydrogen' under a given concept which has something do with understanding in its judgment. Since the component actually exists, its colour moves in two different directions, namely 'green' or other than green. As the second (ii) section refers to resultant, it cannot be the sum of the effect of 'hydrogen' because these do not exist nor does a motion corresponding to the result: 'no colour at all.' Hence its colour other than green or green has a possible extension as its pure component 'hydrogen' is infinite. The first is a necessary truth while the second a casual statement and hence a shadow which is a party to the first. If such judgments exist, a question arises as to how

\_

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> D. Warren, Reality and Impenetrability in Kant's Philosophy of Nature (New York: Rutledge, 2001), p.21

this is possible in CPR. If the causes in metaphysics are 'concealed errors', Kant proposes to flush them out and give a place to special metaphysics, the compounded motion of 'nothing and 'limitation' in their altered state by the signs of geometry.

If the main function of philosophy is to search out the pure concepts as reality and if reality is not accessible, our discussion about reality and its relative term limitation would remain futile without division, exclusion of the erroneous caused by the term limitation. Since we already know that we cannot grasp the reality in totality, reason makes an attempt to synthesize by altering the concept of limitation into object intellect. Hence Kant clearly dwells upon knowledge and its division and limitation with the help of transcendentalism. As Kant says there is a division between transcendent and transcendental, these are not interchangeable words. Limitation of knowledge in Kant is a pivotal study of our hypothesis in which transcendental philosophy reflects the altered state of limitation as 'object intellect'. Limitation comes in the form of the division of knowledge when he discusses phenomena but their possible unity when he discusses noumena. If Kant holds that he was obliged "to limit knowledge in order to make room for faith," it approves limitation's beginning in the 'ampliative principle' and its end in being unlimited with pure concepts or principles in their altered state.

Kant discusses knowledge in a very unique and different manner. He has drawn limitation of knowledge which is at every level. Phenomena and noumena are the basic and fundamental concept where limitation of knowledge evolves. Kant argues limitation in more than one context. However, what Kant aimed at was pure form of matter or substance, pure form of knowledge, pure concepts of understanding and pure form of reason in absolute freewill of the Absolute with some latent force applied on the dogmas which have put walls of impure. We must ensure that facts and ideas are accurate to the demands of reality and relationship among pure concepts and the resulting idea of 'object intellect' is sound and valid, ideal and practical in knowing the 'thing-in -itself.

\*\*\*